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Abstract
Concomitant with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on December 1, 2009, many of
the alleged weaknesses of the mechanisms of protection of fundamental rights are in the process
of being addressed: the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union (”Charter”)
has acquired binding force, the European Union is due to accede to the European Convention
of Human Rights, and the Fundamental Rights Agency (”Agency”) has been established as a
European Union (”EU”) body in charge of monitoring the correct implementation of fundamental
rights throughout the Union. This Essay will address three main questions. First, a question of
legitimacy: is it of any consequence that the Charter has the same legal value as the treaties but is
not part of the treaties? Second, a question of subsidiarity: what is the right level for the protection
of fundamental rights? Last, a question of efficiency of the protection of fundamental rights: what
role can the European Union Fundamental Rights Agency play?
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ESSAY 
CHALLENGES FOR THE PROTECTION OF 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN THE EU AT THE 
TIME OF THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE 
LISBON TREATY 
Jacqueline Dutheil de la Rochere* 
INTRODUCTION 
Concomitant with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty 
on December 1, 2009,1 many of the alleged weaknesses of the 
mechanisms of protection of fundamental rights are in the 
process of being addressed: the Charter of the Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union (“Charter”)2 has acquired binding 
force, the European Union is due to accede to the European 
Convention of Human Rights,3 and the Fundamental Rights 
Agency (“Agency”) has been established as a European Union 
(“EU”) body in charge of monitoring the correct 
implementation of fundamental rights throughout the Union.4 
In the 2009–2014 Commission there is a commissioner, Viviane 
Reding-Justice, in charge of fundamental rights.5 Is the situation 
now satisfactory? In this new context, what are the challenges still 
facing the protection of fundamental rights? Obviously the 
 
* Professor and former President, University of Paris II. A similar version of this 
Essay was presented in Cambridge, England, at a December 2009 conference discussing 
the Treaty of Lisbon and its aftermath. 
1. The Treaty of Lisbon, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. C 306/1, at 13 (consolidated 
version divided into the Treaty on European Union, 2008 O.J. C 115/13 [hereinafter 
TEU post-Lisbon], and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 2008 O.J. 
C 115/47 [hereinafter TFEU]). 
2. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000 O.J. C 364/1 
[hereinafter Charter of Fundamental Rights]. 
3. TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 1, art. 6(2), 2007 O.J. C 306, at 13. 
4. Council Regulation No. 168/2007, 2007 O.J. L 53/1, at 2. 
5. See, e.g., Press Release, European Parliament, Summary of Hearing of Viviane 
Reding—Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship (Jan. 11, 2010), 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdfs/news/expert/infopress/20100111IPR67125/
20100111IPR67125_en.pdf. 
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answers depend not only on the constitutional evolution of the 
European Union but also on various external and 
complementary factors. 
Before trying to propose some elements of an answer, it is 
important to recall some landmark events on the question of 
human rights in the EU. As is well known, the EU began as the 
European Economic Community (“EEC”), totally economically 
oriented; it was not designed to be a human rights organization. 
The notion of human rights enshrined in the general principles 
of European Community (“EC”) law was forged by European 
Court of Justice (“Court of Justice” or “Court”) case law, 
inaugurated by Stauder v. City of Ulm,6 to counteract Germany’s 
questioning of the supremacy of EC law.7 Subsequently, the 
Court constructed a human rights doctrine in a series of relevant 
cases, but from a pragmatic perspective, without defining an 
overall human rights policy.8 The EEC did have one specific 
human rights provision, article 119 of the Treaty establishing the 
European Economic Community, which required equal pay for 
men and women.9 Further, the EC was relatively quick to develop 
human rights aspects of its external policy and enlargement 
policy, with repercussions on its internal policy. The EC moved 
gradually towards political initiatives as well as economic ones, 
implying a more direct and substantial concern for human rights, 
particularly in the context of action taken in the field of 
Cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs, the so-called third 
pillar, introduced by the Treaty of Maastricht’s Treaty on 
European Union (“Maastricht TEU”) in 1993. The initial Treaty 
on European Union’s article 6 reflected formulas of the Court of 
Justice’s case law concerning the respect of fundamental rights as 
general principles of Community law. However, the Court 
nonetheless held that the Community had no competence to 
 
6. Stauder v. City of Ulm, Case 29/69, [1969] E.C.R. 419. 
7. See TAKIS TRIDIMAS, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EC LAW 204–05 & nn.9–11 
(1999). 
8. Id. at 204. 
9. The initial Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community article 119 
was absorbed into article 141(1) of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing 
the European Community, 2006 O.J. C 321 E/37 [hereinafter EC Treaty] (and now is 
found in TFEU, supra note 1, art. 157, 2008 O.J. C 115). 
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legislate in the domain of basic rights in its well-known Opinion 
2/94.10 
EU institutions, particularly the European Parliament, 
developed concern for human rights issues; but the Cologne 
European Council’s designation in June 1999 of the convention 
charged with drafting the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights was 
the first formal initiative aimed at defining proper EU 
parameters of human rights protection. Until then, the 
incremental judicial and political developments concerning 
fundamental rights in the European Union were the product of 
reaction to historical circumstances, not the result of a 
thoughtful EU policy on human rights. Due to the difficulty of 
the new approach, the convention convened in 1999 gave 
preference to codification of existing practices instead of taking 
innovative routes. The Charter used the European Convention of 
Human Rights11 as its main source of inspiration, enriched by 
provisions of the EC and EU treaties, secondary legislation, and 
the case law of the Court of Justice, plus some other international 
sources or constitutional traditions common to the Member 
States. The Charter’s main novelty was its chapter on social 
rights, the formulation of which borrowed widely from that of the 
Community Social Charter12 and EC secondary legislation. 
The Charter of Fundamental Rights, proclaimed in Nice in 
December 2000, subsequently became a master card in the 
constitutional debate, as a potential bill of rights of the future 
constitution of the European Union.13 The decision to include 
the Charter in extenso as Part II of the draft Treaty Establishing a 
Constitution for Europe14 was part of the process of the 
constitutionalization of the EU. Nonetheless, the substance of the 
Charter was not discussed at all at the convention of 2002–2003, 
 
10. Opinion 2/94, [1996] E.C.R. I-1759, ¶¶ 27, 33–35. 
11. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter European Convention on Human Rights]. 
12. Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers, Dec. 9, 1989, 
available at http:// www.aedh.eu/the-community-charter-of.html. 
13. See Tony Joris & Jan Vandenberghe, The Council of Europe and the European 
Union: Natural Partners or Uneasy Bedfellows?, 15 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 1 (2008); John L. 
Murray, Fundamental Rights in the European Community Legal Order, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 
531, 547 (2009). 
14. See Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, Part II, 2004 O.J. C 
310/1, at 41–54 (never ratified) [hereinafter Draft Treaty]. 
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which prepared the initial draft constitutional treaty, nor at the 
subsequent Intergovernmental Conference; instead, participants 
only discussed the question of its possible binding effect and the 
limits thereof.15 
The adoption of the Lisbon Treaty marks the renunciation 
of any structuring role the Charter could have played in the 
constitutional order. The explicit provisions of the new article 6 
of the Treaty on European Union16 (“TEU”) post-Lisbon on 
fundamental rights have the merit of clarifying sources. However, 
the Charter is referred to as having the same legal value as the 
treaties, but is not reproduced in the Lisbon Treaty itself. TEU 
article 6 only includes the Charter along with the European 
Convention of Human Rights to which the Union is mandated to 
adhere (article 6.2) and other fundamental rights not included 
in the Charter which altogether will constitute general principles 
of EU law (article 6.3). 
Other new TEU post-Lisbon provisions merit attention, 
which all tend to reduce the significance of the Charter. TEU 
post-Lisbon article 2 enumerates the values on which the Union 
is founded, making an express reference to protection of the 
rights of persons belonging to minorities.17 A new general 
obligation to combat exclusion and discrimination is formulated, 
including solidarity between generations and protection of the 
right of the child.18 Further, the jurisdiction of the European 
Court of Justice is substantially expanded to areas such as police 
and judicial cooperation in the area of criminal law, which are of 
clear relevance to the protection of fundamental rights. 
 
15. Council of the European Union, 2007 Intergovernmental Conference [ICG] 
Mandate, ¶ 9 & n.3 (2007). The working group in charge of the Charter at the 
convention of 2002–2003 was ready to accept any concession required by the opponents 
to the Charter (among whom the British were vocal) concerning its scope, the 
conditions of its interpretation, or the value of explanations referred to in the Charter 
in order to include it in the draft. The general provisions of the Charter (articles 52 to 
54) were adopted in consequence and the Charter became Part II of the draft 
Constitutional Treaty. See Draft Treaty, supra note 14, art. II, 2004 O.J. C 310/1, at 41–
54. 
16. TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 1, art. 6, 2008 O.J. C 115, at 19. 
17. Id. art. 2, at 17. Minorities are referred to in articles 21 and 22 of the Charter. 
18. Id. art. 3(3), at 28. Note that the entire article 21 of the Charter deals with non-
discrimination. 
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Additionally, TEU post-Lisbon provisions emphasize democracy, 
participation, and transparency.19 
At this point in time, it seems interesting to examine to what 
extent the questions concerning fundamental rights which 
predated the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty remain partly 
unanswered despite (and sometimes because of) various 
provisions of the treaty. 
This Essay will address three main questions. First, a 
question of legitimacy: is it of any consequence that the Charter 
has the same legal value as the treaties but is not part of the 
treaties? Second, a question of subsidiarity: what is the right level 
for the protection of fundamental rights? Last, a question of 
efficiency of the protection of fundamental rights: what role can 
the EU Fundamental Rights Agency play? 
I. THE CHARTER HAS THE SAME LEGAL VALUE AS THE 
TREATIES BUT IS NOT PART OF THE TREATIES 
A. Primary Law by Reference 
After the Draft Constitutional Treaty failed in ratification 
referenda in France and the Netherlands in 2005, the general 
political reaction to any forms of constitutional symbols affected 
the Charter. The political leaders considered that the Charter 
could no longer appear as Part II of the Treaty; if maintained, it 
would have to have a lower profile. A direct mention in article 6 
TEU of the Lisbon Treaty was preferred to a specific protocol. 
Consequently, the text of the Charter does not appear anywhere 
in the official primary text of the published treaties. In contrast, 
Protocol 3020 and Declarations 1, 53, 61, and 6221 provide for 
 
19. Broad consultation with concerned parties, including NGOs, is becoming the 
norm at the EU level. TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 1, arts. 11(1), 11(2), 11(3), 2008 O.J. 
C 115, at 21. See National parliaments are equipped with a new role in overseeing EU 
legislation. Id. art. 12, at 21; Protocol on the Role of National Parliaments in the 
European Union, 2007 O.J. C 306/01, at 148. For the first time in the history of 
European integration, an instrument of direct democracy is introduced at the EU level. 
One million citizens who are nationals of a “significant number of Member States” can 
invite the European Commission to submit a proposal of a legal act. See TEU post-
Lisbon, supra note 1, art. 11(4), 2008 O.J. C 115/13, at 21. 
20. EC Treaty, supra note 9, Protocol 30, 2006 O.J. C 321 E/37. 
21. See Council of the European Union, Final Act of the IGC, 2007 O.J. C 306/231, 
at 249, 267, 270. 
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restrictions on the application of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, either in general or with regard to specific Member 
States: the Czech Republic, Poland, and the United Kingdom. 
TEU post-Lisbon article 6.1 stipulates: “The Union 
recognises the rights, freedoms and principles set out in the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 7 
December 2000, as adapted at Strasbourg, on December 12, 
2007, which shall have the same legal value as the Treaties.”22 
Accordingly, the Charter does not have by its nature the 
status of primary law; it is primary law only because the TEU 
accords it “the same legal value as the Treaties.”23 There is no 
special dignity given to the substantive content of the Charter, 
nor does it have a clause of perpetual nature. Incidentally, in the 
absence of special provisions thereupon, one may wonder how 
the Charter might be amended in the future. Moreover, the 
recognition that the Charter should have the same legal value as 
the treaties is immediately balanced by text limiting the scope of 
the Charter and its interpretation. Article 6.1 TEU goes on to say: 
 The provisions of the Charter shall not extend in any way 
the competence of the Union as defined in the Treaties. 
 The rights, freedoms and principles in the Charter shall be 
interpreted in accordance with the general provisions in 
Title VII of the Charter governing its interpretation and 
application and with due regard to the explanations referred 
to in the Charter, that set out the sources of those 
provisions.24 
There are a number of limiting provisions, some mentioned 
directly in article 6.1, and others that appear in the general 
provisions of the Charter and were added to the initial text of the 
Charter during the elaboration of the Draft Treaty Establishing a 
Constitution for Europe.25 These general limitations are in 
addition to the numerous specific limitations inserted in the 
 
22. TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 1, 2008 O.J. C 115, at 19. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. 
25. See generally Draft Treaty, supra note 14. These limitations refer to the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States, national legislation 
implementing principles contained in the Charter, national laws and practice, and 
explanations annexed to the Charter providing guidance for its interpretation. Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, arts. 52–54, 2007 O.J. C 303/1, at 13–14. 
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various substantive provisions of the Charter.26 Further, 
according to TEU post-Lisbon article 6.3, the “rights, freedoms 
and principles set out in the Charter” are put on the same level 
as “fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European 
Convention . . . of Human Rights . . . and as they result from the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States” which 
“constitute general principles of Union’s law.”27 This means that 
the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance (“CFI”) (now 
named the General Court) may supplement the substantive 
provisions of the Charter by using other sources of fundamental 
rights as long as they qualify as general principles of Union law. 
At the very moment when the Charter acquires the authority of 
primary law, that authority is undermined. 
To a certain extent, the period that ended with the entry 
into force of the Lisbon Treaty may appear as the golden age of 
the Charter, freely used by EU judges as the authoritative 
instrument of reference concerning fundamental rights. The 
Charter proclaimed in Nice by the Presidents of the European 
Parliament, the Council, and the Commission, although not 
binding as such, has been progressively referred to by the CFI 
and by the Court of Justice, encouraged in that direction by its 
Advocates General who considered it as the most valuable 
expression of general principles of EC/EU law.28 More recently 
the Court of Justice referred directly to the Charter as a direct 
source of fundamental rights either because a directive referred 
to the Charter in its recitals,29 or because of the generally 
accepted authority of the Charter.30 Because the TEU post-
Lisbon has included the Charter among other sources of primary 
law, the Charter has gained more influence at the level of 
Member States. But ultimately, the substantive provisions of the 
Charter have no more authority than any other provision of the 
 
26. See, e.g., arts. 27, 28, 30, 34, 2007 O.J. C 303/1, at 8–9. 
27. TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 1, arts. 6.1, 6.3, 2008 O.J. C 115/13, at 19. 
28. See, e.g., Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano, The Queen v. Sec’y of State for 
Trade & Indus., Case C-173/99, [2001] E.C.R. I-4881, ¶¶ 26–27. 
29. Parliament v. Council, Case C-540/03, [2006] E.C.R. I-5769, ¶ 4 (concerning 
the validity of a directive on family reunification). 
30. See, e.g., Laval un Partneri, Ltd. v. Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, Case C-341/05, 
[2007] E.C.R. I-11,767, ¶ 2; Int’l Transp. Workers Fed’n. v. Viking Line ABP, Case C-
438/05, [2007] E.C.R. I-10,779; Unibet Ltd. v. Justitiekanslern, Case C-432/05, [2007] 
E.C.R. 2271, ¶ 37. 
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treaties and its scope, encapsulated in written law, is more limited 
than that of other general principles of EU law. 
B. Scope of the Charter: Fundamental Rights and the Competences of 
the Union 
When TEU post-Lisbon article 6.1 takes care to underline 
that the Charter shall not extend the competences of the Union, 
this is not new—article 51.2 of the Charter heralded this from 
the origin, and that was subsequently reinforced in the second 
version (Part II of the Draft Constitutional Treaty and the text 
proclaimed in 2007).31 The purpose of this reservation is to 
diminish the anxiousness of those who are afraid that the 
recognition of a right in the Charter could have the effect of 
engendering an EU competence concerning such right. A 
number of eminent lawyers have demonstrated that such fear is 
the result of insufficient understanding of the mechanism of 
protection of fundamental rights in the Union.32 Fundamental 
rights limit the actions of the Union; they do not found new 
competences, as the Court very clearly stated in its Opinion 
2/94.33 For instance, the Union, in the exercise of its own 
competences, has an obligation to respect freedom of religion; 
this does not imply in any way that it has competence to legislate 
on religious matters.34 
These fears exist and have existed from the beginning of the 
discussion of the Charter; it is of the essence of fundamental 
rights that they relate to the person in his or her entirety while an 
international organization of the type of the EU has only 
conferred competences. There exists an essential contradiction 
between the fundamentality of the Charter rights and the 
limitations imposed by the Treaties to the scope of their 
competences. The vicissitudes during the renegotiation of the 
Lisbon Treaty and its entry into force demonstrate that these 
 
31. The new redaction of article 51.2 of the Charter adds the sentence: “The 
Charter does not establish any new power or task for the Community or the Union, or 
modify powers or tasks defined by the Treaties.” Charter of Fundamental Rights, supra 
note 25, art. 51(2), 207 O.J. C 303, at 13. 
32. See, e.g., Jean-Paul Jacqué, Le Traitéde Lisbonne une vue Cavaliére, 44 REVUE 
TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT EUROPÉEN 439, 447 (2008). 
33. Opinion 2/94, [1996] E.C.R. I-1759, ¶¶ 27, 33–35. 
34. Compare the text of the Charter concerning freedom of thought, conscience, 
and religion with that of TFEU art. 17, 2008 O.J. C 115, at 55. 
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fears and contradictions are still there, reinforced by the 
recognition that the Charter now has the authority of primary 
law. 
If we examine the fears expressed by the President of the 
Czech Republic concerning the possible effect of the Charter on 
Beneš decrees dating from the 1940s,35 it is clear his concerns are 
more political than the result of serious legal advice. However, 
who can say with certainty that there is no issue concerning the 
exact scope of the Charter taken together with the uncertain 
boundaries of EU competences, and that article 6.1 TEU gives a 
definite answer? 
The scope of the Charter is determined in its article 51. This 
provision establishes that the Charter applies to the institutions 
and bodies of the Union, with due regard for the principle of 
subsidiarity and to the Member States “only when they are 
implementing Union law.”36 Then we turn to the Explanations to 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which according to article 
6.1, should be used for the interpretation of the Charter: 
 As regards the Member States, it follows unambiguously 
from the case-law of the Court of Justice that the 
requirement to respect fundamental rights defined in the 
context of the Union is only binding on the Member States 
when they act in the scope of Union law. The Court of 
Justice confirmed this case-law in the following terms: “In 
addition, it should be remembered that the requirements 
flowing from the protection of fundamental rights in the 
Community legal order are also binding on Member States 
when they implement Community rules.” Of course this 
principle, as enshrined in this Charter, applies to the central 
authorities as well as to regional or local bodies, and to 
public organisations, when they are implementing Union 
law.37 
 
35. See Steve Peers, The Beneš Decrees and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, 
STATEWATCH, Oct. 12, 2009, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2009/oct/lisbon-benes-
decree.pdf. 
36. Charter of Fundamental Rights, supra note 25, art. 51(2), 2007 O.J. C 303, at 
13. 
37. Explanations Relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights title VII, 2007 O.J. 
C 303/17, at 32 [hereinafter Explanations] (citations omitted). 
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One may note the variation in vocabulary. Article 51 of the 
Charter says “only when they are implementing Union law.”38 
The Explanations speak of acting “in the scope of Union law,” 
but cite the recent case law which refers to “implementing” 
Union law. Whatever the imperfection of redaction, the correct 
interpretation of article 51 would seem to be not what it says but 
how it has to be understood in the light of the case law, and that 
means that the Charter might apply to Member States when they 
are acting within the scope of Union law. But even that remains 
unclear and uncertain because the boundaries of EU law depend 
on an evolution of the case law of the Court, which no one can 
anticipate. 
Some critical comments have recently been published 
concerning the unpredictability of the Court on the question of 
EU competencies.39 The problem is not that fundamental rights 
cover wide areas that do not necessarily coincide with the limits 
of competence of the Union: this is of their very nature as 
instruments of protection of individuals. The problem comes 
from the complex system according to which competences are 
conferred to the Union but are frequently implemented by the 
Member States. The uncertain limits of the scope of Union law 
have the consequence that no one can anticipate the possible 
impact of the intersection between Union law and the rights 
enshrined in the Charter. The late Judge Pescatore cited the 
“surface de contact” between EC law and human rights.40 Political 
concerns naturally arise, reinforced by the recognition that the 
Charter has the legal authority of primary law, and not alleviated 
by the affirmation that the Charter shall not extend the 
competences of the Union. The Charter may yet have 
unexpected results when issues arise that were not initially 
intended to fall within the realm of EU law (for example, family 
life, patronymic name, and private property). Protocol 30 may 
 
38. Charter of Fundamental Rights, supra note 25, art. 51. 
39. See e.g., Editorial Comments, The Court of Justice in the Limelight Again, 45 
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1571, 1571–79 (2008). 
40. Pierre Pescatore, La Coopération Entre la Cour Communautaire, les Juridictions 
Nationales et la Cour Européenne des Droits de l’Homme Dans la Protection des Droits 
Fondamentaux: Enquête Sur un Problème Virtuel [Cooperation between the Community Court, 
National Courts, and European Court of Human Rights in the Protection of Fundamental Rights: 
Examination of a Virtual Problem], 466 REVUE DU MARCHÉ COMMUN ET DE L’UNION 
EUROPÉENNE 151, 156 (2003). 
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prove not to be the shield that Poland and the United Kingdom 
wanted.41 The problem does not come from the way fundamental 
rights are defined in the Charter, but rather from the uncertainty 
of the scope of EU law which still remains under the Lisbon 
Treaty. 
C. Interpretation of the Charter: Balance Between Fundamental Rights 
and Economic Freedoms 
The Charter has the same legal value as the treaties but is 
not a part of the treaties; it is by a Treaty of Lisbon provision that 
the Charter acquires a dimension of primary law. This may have 
unpredictable consequences when the Charter has to be 
interpreted in case of conflict between provisions of the treaties 
and rights enshrined in the Charter. The recent decisions of the 
Court in 2007 in Viking and Laval42 indicate, first, that the Court, 
after the signature of the Lisbon Treaty but before its entry into 
force, was ready to accept that the Charter could create legal 
obligations and, second, that in case of conflict between 
fundamental rights and fundamental economic freedoms 
established by the treaties the latter might prevail (the Court’s 
conclusion in Laval,43 later reiterated in Rüffert44). The cases 
present not so much an issue of rights opposed to principles, or 
an issue of justiciability under the Charter’s article 52.4 or 
Protocol 30 of the Lisbon Treaty, but rather a question of 
balance between rights. In Laval, for example, the Court 
analyzed the social right to strike as an exception to the free 
movement of services, one of the treaty’s fundamental economic 
freedoms. 
It is unlikely that under the Lisbon Treaty, the EU will 
embark on a more human-rights-oriented profile. Although the 
economic potentialities of the European Economic Community 
have been more or less exhausted by the completion of the single 
market and the achievement of the four freedoms (even if many 
 
41. On the interpretation of Protocol 30, see Michael Dougan, The Treaty of Lisbon 
2007: Winning Minds, Not Hearts, 45 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 617, 665–71 (2008). 
42. Int’l Transp. Workers Fed’n. v. Viking Line ABP, Case C-438/05, [2007] E.C.R. 
I-10,779; Laval un Partneri, Ltd. v. Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, Case C-341/05, [2007] 
E.C.R. I-11,767. 
43. Laval, [2007] E.C.R. I-11,767, ¶¶ 103–11. 
44. Rüffert v. Niedersachsen, Case C-346/06, [2008] E.C.R. 1989, ¶ 44. 
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fields of possible economic harmonization subsist), the EU, now 
a hybrid body and a significant world political actor, retains its 
economic origins. In contrast, in human rights thinking, 
following the views of the Strasbourg Court of Human Rights, a 
right-holder is seen as an individual per se and fundamental 
rights are interpreted and applied objectively. The EU model is 
very different. Freedom of movement and other EU-based 
freedoms are firmly attached to EU citizenship; economic 
freedoms represent the very structure of the Union, while the 
other fundamental rights—for example, social rights—enshrined 
in the Charter do not, even if they correspond to competences 
existing in the treaties (the current TFEU chapter on Social 
policy).45 The European Trade Union Conference’s proposed 
clause in the Lisbon Treaty, which would have set as a principle 
that fundamental social rights should prevail over the 
fundamental economic freedoms of the Union, was not 
adopted.46 Therefore we may assume that the Court of Justice will 
continue to use its discretion in determining the correct balance 
between economic freedoms and social rights on a case-by-case 
basis, using various modes of reasoning: proportionality, 
exceptions, and derogations.47 The task of the Court will become 
more and more difficult with the frequent absence of consensus 
between the twenty-seven Member States on economic and social 
questions. 
This impression that the present state of affairs should 
remain unchanged is reinforced by the mention in article 6.3 
TEU that general principles of EU law will continue to play their 
role as a source of fundamental rights in parallel with and as a 
complement to the Charter and the European Convention on 
Human Rights. Fundamental rights in the Lisbon Treaty have a 
restrictive and not constructive function. 
 
45. TFEU, supra note 1, arts. 151–61, 2008 O.J. C 115, at 114–19. 
46. European Trade Union Confederation, Res. EC.179, (Mar. 4, 2008), 4 
(responding to the Court judgments in Viking and Laval), available at 
http://www.etuc.org/IMG/pdf_ETUC_Viking_Laval_-_resolution_070308.pdf. 
47. See, e.g., Schmidberger v. Austria, Case C-112/00, [2003] E.C.R. I-5659, ¶ 60; 
Omega Spielhallen v. Bonn, Case C-36/02, [2004] E.C.R. I-9609, ¶¶ 1–2. 
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II. WHAT IS THE RIGHT LEVEL FOR THE PROTECTION OF 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS? 
It seems quite sensible to consider that the respect of 
fundamental rights should be recognized and ensured at the 
level where decisions are taken and substantive legislative or 
regulatory power is exerted. Recent history also adds the 
experience of mechanisms of supervision at a supranational level, 
either regional or universal. In the early European Community, 
the protection of fundamental rights received its initial 
inspiration not only from the constitutional traditions common 
to the Member States, but also from principles enshrined in 
international conventions of which Member States were 
signatories or parties, principally the European Convention on 
Human Rights. The question of the relationship between the 
protection granted by the European Convention of Human 
Rights and that proper to the EC/EU system has been a 
permanent feature of the European law landscape that the 
Lisbon Treaty addresses clearly. But there are other dimensions 
linked to globalization and the claim for national identity that 
the new treaty leaves as they stand. 
A. Adherence of the European Union to the European Convention of 
Human Rights 
The Lisbon Treaty’s TEU article 6.2 states that the Union 
shall accede to the European Convention of Human Rights and, 
unsurprisingly, that “[s]uch accession shall not affect the Union’s 
competences as defined in the treaties.”48 Adherence by the EU 
to the Convention will require negotiation and conclusion in 
accordance with the provisions of TFEU article 218, which 
requires unanimity in the Council and the consent of the 
European Parliament.49 The Council of Europe has long 
foreseen this. Some institutional adaptations will have to be made 
on both sides, but the result will have two significant advantages. 
First, powers of action within the EU legal order will become 
subject to external supervision in the same manner as 
comparable powers exercised by legislative, administrative, and 
judicial authorities of the Member States. This will avoid artificial 
 
48. TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 1, 2008 O.J. C 115, at 19. 
49. TFEU, supra note 1, art. 218, 2008 O.J. C 115, at 144–45. 
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constructions50 presented with only mitigated success to the 
European Court of Human Rights when it has reviewed in recent 
years the behavior of EU institutions,51 and will serve to 
guarantee the application of a common code of fundamental 
values. Second, this should help to achieve the coherence 
between the Charter and the Convention that article 52.3 of the 
Charter addresses. Once the Union is a party to the Convention, 
the provisions of the Convention, together with the case law of 
the Strasbourg Court, should serve as a minimum standard. This 
will not prevent EU law from providing more extensive 
protection, through either the Court’s interpretation of the 
Charter or the introduction of new general principles of human 
rights not contemplated at the time of the drafting of the 
Convention in the 1950s.52 
The process of EU accession will certainly take some time. 
One may also expect problems in achieving ratification. The 
EU’s accession may well increase the burden on the already 
overloaded European Court of Human Rights, making the 
modifications introduced by protocol 14 to the Convention even 
more welcome. 
B. Globalization and Alignment to Universal Standards 
The prevention of terrorism has recently shown that the EU 
cannot isolate itself from universal human rights constraints. The 
European Union, to the extent it holds competences previously 
held by sovereign states and now transferred to it through the 
combined treaty provisions concerning internal market 
economic freedoms and the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy, has to comply with the obligations imposed by UN 
Security Council resolutions adopted under Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter.53 However, the Yusuf54 and Kadi55 judgments 
 
50. This term refers to the phenomenon that arises from the obligation of victims 
of a violation of the ECHR by an EU institution to bring a complaint against all the 
Members States rather than the institutions themselves. Because the EU is not a party to 
the Convention, there is no way to bring a case directly against EU institutions. 
51. See, e.g., Matthews v. United Kingdom, 1999-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 251 (1999). 
52. This is, for instance, the case as regards article 9 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights as compared with article 12 of the European Convention on Human Rights (the 
wording concerning family rights has been modernized to cover relationships other 
than marriage). 
53. U.N. Charter arts. 39–51. 
  
1790 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 33:1776 
demonstrate that the standard of protection of fundamental 
rights that the Security Council Sanctions Committee considers 
when deciding on measures that freeze the assets of persons 
included on a list of presumed terrorists has little to do with 
accepted European codes of values. Is it possible that such 
sanctions should be implemented in the European Union, 
without any margin of discretion, through EU legal instruments 
such as common positions of the Council and EC regulations? 
The answer of the CFI in Kadi was that it followed from the 
principles governing the relationship between the international 
legal order under the United Nations and the Community legal 
order that the contested sanction regulation, since it was 
designed to give effect to a resolution adopted under a provision 
of the UN Charter affording no latitude in that respect, could 
not be the subject of judicial review. However, conscious of the 
importance of the respect of a minimum standard of human 
rights, the CFI surprisingly introduced the idea that it could and 
should examine the compatibility of the contested regulation 
with the norms of jus cogens considered as a minimum standard 
of human rights protection under international law.56 The CFI 
then concluded that the principles of jus cogens had not been 
infringed. 
On appeal, the Court of Justice, in its judgment of 
September 3, 2008, took a different view.57 The Court considered 
that the judicial review of the lawfulness of the contested 
regulation in the light of fundamental rights is “a constitutional 
guarantee forming part of the very foundations of the 
Community.”58 As a consequence, it belongs to the Court “in 
accordance with the powers conferred on it by the EC Treaty, 
[to] ensure the review, in principle the full review, of the 
lawfulness of all Community acts in the light of the fundamental 
rights forming an integral part of the general principles of 
Community law, including the review of measures which . . . are 
 
54. Yusuf & Al Barakaat Int’l Found. v. Council, Case T-306/01, [2005] E.C.R. II-
3533. 
55. Kadi & Al Barakaat Int’l Found. v. Council, Joined Cases C-402/05 P & C-
415/05 P, [2008] E.C.R. I-6353. 
56. Kadi v. Council and Commission, T-315/01 [2005] E.C.R. II-3649, ¶ 226. 
57. Kadi & Al Barakaat, [2008] E.C.R. I-6353, ¶¶ 88, 314, 327. 
58. Id. ¶ 290. 
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designed to give effect to resolutions adopted by the Security 
Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.”59 
The issue cannot be presented more clearly: what is the 
right level for the definition of fundamental rights standards? 
Should the principle of supremacy of international law prevent 
the European Union from imposing the respect of its own 
human rights standards when implementing international 
sanctions in its own legal system, using its proper instruments of 
regulation and judicial review? Interestingly, the Commission 
tried, in its submission to the Court, to defend a sort of “so lange” 
type of reasoning, arguing that so long as under the UN system of 
sanctions the individuals and entities concerned had an 
acceptable opportunity to be heard through a mechanism of 
administrative review, the Court should not intervene in any way 
whatsoever.60 In response, the Court scrutinized the re-
examination procedure before the UN Sanctions Committee, 
and the amendments recently made to it, before holding that the 
re-examination procedure did not offer sufficient guarantees of 
judicial protection of rights. Therefore the Court considered that 
it had a duty to proceed to a full examination of the lawfulness of 
the contested regulation in the light of fundamental rights, 
which form part of the general principles of Community law. The 
Court ultimately concluded that the contested regulation 
infringed several rights principles (i.e., right to defense, right to 
be heard, and right of property).61 A door remains open for 
reconsideration in the unlikely event that the UN establishes a 
system of sanctions guaranteeing judicial protection. 
At the moment, while the Lisbon Treaty underlines the 
specificities of EU external action, there seems to exist a certain 
tendency of the Court to proclaim the EU’s constitutional 
identity and, accordingly, resist the primacy of international law. 
Other examples can be cited in the area of trade law or the law of 
the sea, such as the Court’s judgments in FIAMM62 and 
Intertanko.63 The debate concerning the respective application of 
 
59. Id. ¶ 326. 
60. Id. ¶ 319. 
61. Id. ¶ 330. 
62. FIAMM & FEDON v. Council, Joined Cases C-120–21/06 P, [2008] E.C.R. I-
6513. 
63. The Queen, on the application of Intertanko v. Sec’y of State for Transp., Case 
C-308/06, [2008] E.C.R. I-4057. 
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international standards of protection of human rights in 
comparison to European ones—henceforth enshrined in the 
Charter and the other sources referred to in the new article 6 
TEU—does not supersede another, more traditional debate on 
the relationship between European and national level of 
protection of fundamental rights. 
C. European and National Protection of Fundamental Rights 
This classical theme remains of interest because of some 
recent developments in national constitutional court case law. 
Article 53 of the Charter, defining the “Level of Protection,” 
states that nothing in the Charter “shall be interpreted as 
restricting or adversely affecting human rights and fundamental 
freedoms as recognised, in their . . . fields of application . . . by 
the Member States’ constitutions.”64 The national constitutional 
courts did not wait for the Lisbon Treaty to accord the authority 
of primary law to the Charter. The well-known classical case law 
of German and Italian constitutional courts concerning their 
protection of fundamental rights has been enriched by French65 
and Spanish constitutional courts: respect for the primacy of 
EC/EU law to the extent it does not interfere with or contradict 
fundamental rights or fundamental values expressed in the 
national constitution and constitute an essential element of 
national sovereignty. 
Interestingly, the decision of the German Constitutional 
Court of June 30, 2009 on the Lisbon Treaty66 is centered on the 
structural problems of the European Union and its democratic 
legitimacy. The question of fundamental rights arises on two 
occasions. First, the Court examines the extent to which the right 
to vote is sufficiently respected, the right to vote being 
considered equivalent to a fundamental right and anchored in 
human dignity, a fundamental element of the principle of 
democracy.67 Further, examining the extent of transfer of powers 
to the European Union, the German Constitutional Court 
recommends a narrow interpretation of those Lisbon Treaty 
 
64. Charter of Fundamental Rights, supra note 25, 2007 O.J. C 303/1, at 14. 
65. See, e.g., CC decision no. 2004-496DC, June 10, 2004, O.J. 192, 11,182. 
66. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] June 30, 
2009, Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, ¶ 210 (F.R.G.). 
67. Id. ¶ 210. 
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provisions that may have an impact on the citizens’ circumstances 
of life, private space, political action, and social security.68 It 
recommends the same narrow application of the provisions on 
criminal law and criminal procedure: 
To the extent that in these areas, which are of particular 
importance for democracy, a transfer of sovereign powers is 
permitted at all, a narrow interpretation is required. This 
concerns in particular the administration of criminal law, the 
police monopoly, and that of the military, on the use of 
force, fundamental fiscal decisions on revenue and 
expenditure, the shaping of the circumstances of life by 
social policy and important decisions on cultural issues such 
as the school and education system, the provisions governing 
the media, and dealing with religious communities.69 
The words used by the Federal Constitutional Court remind 
us of precise cases decided by the Court of Justice. The German 
court’s judgment clearly inspired the Czech Constitutional Court 
in its decision of November 3, 2009.70 
No striking conclusion can be drawn concerning the 
protection of fundamental rights, except that the national courts 
reaffirm their own legitimate role—the Court of Justice must 
pragmatically take into account this request for a restrictive 
interpretation of the Lisbon Treaty when fundamental rights are 
affected. This is in line with the Lisbon Treaty’s TEU article 4.2, 
which underlines that “[t]he Union shall respect the . . . national 
identities” of Member States “inherent in their fundamental 
structures, political and constitutional.”71 However, it becomes 
clear that a multilevel system of protection of fundamental rights 
has to be considered, combining national, regional and universal 
mechanisms, in reaction to multilevel threats. 
 
68. Id. ¶¶ 226, 249. 
69. Press Release, Federal Constitutional Court, Act Approving the Treaty of 
Lisbon Compatible with the Basic Law; accompanying law is unconstitutional to the 
extent that German legislative bodies have not been accorded sufficient rights of 
participation (June 30, 2009). 
70. Press Release, Constitutional Court, The Treaty of Lisbon is in conformity with 
the Constitutional Order of the Czech Republic and there is nothing to prevent its 
ratification (Nov. 3, 2009). 
71. TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 1, 2008 O.J. C 115, at 18. 
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III. EFFICIENCY OF THE PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL 
RIGHTS: THE ROLE OF THE EU FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
AGENCY 
As underlined above, the first aim of the European 
Community legal order was not the protection of an individual’s 
fundamental rights, but rather the construction of an internal 
market in order to create a common European future. 
Fundamental rights were only gradually recognized and only to 
limit the discretion of supranational institutions. The recognized 
rights took the shape of unwritten general principles used by the 
Court in its process of judicial review. However, after the 
Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties added TEU articles 6 and 7, 
the concern for fundamental rights contributed to the 
determination of the Union’s objectives and activities, and 
induced the development of a more constructive policy in that 
area. In 1993, the European Council set out the well-known 
Copenhagen criteria, which the then Central European applicant 
nations had to fulfill before they could join the EU in 2004 and 
2007. The first Copenhagen criterion required the applicants to 
be representative democracies with a respect for fundamental 
rights. This political policy requirement set by the European 
Council and enforced by the Commission during the pre-
accession period indicated that the monitoring and enforcement 
of human rights mattered as much as ex post judicial review. The 
view that negative control should be supplemented by positive 
action, i.e., active political and administrative promotion of 
fundamental rights, eventually led, after the adoption of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, to the creation of the 
Fundamental Rights Agency. 
In the 1990s, the growing power of xenophobic parties in 
several Member States72 as well as continuing structural problems 
in the treatment of minorities such as the Roma people in 
Central Europe73 drove the process for establishing a European 
 
72. Far-right xenophobic parties have achieved significant minorities in national 
and regional parliaments in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, and the Netherlands 
since the mid-1990s. 
73. See István Pogány, Minority Rights and the Roma of Central and Eastern Europe, 6 
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 3 (2006) (“Nor have minority rights instruments reversed the 
escalation in anti-Roma sentiment and violence that has been a feature of the CEE 
region since the ousting of Communist administrations.”). 
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Monitoring Centre for Racism and Xenophobia (“Centre”), 
which was created by EC Regulation 1035/97 of June 2, 1997.74 
The Centre’s prime task was to provide “objective, reliable and 
comparable data” on the phenomena of racism, xenophobia, 
and anti-Semitism at the European level.75 The Centre was 
mandated to examine the causes, consequences, and effects of 
these manifestations, and identify examples of successful 
counterstrategies. After the adoption of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, the European Council, in December 2003, 
stressed in its conclusions the importance of human rights data 
collection and analysis with a view to defining Union policy in the 
field of human rights. The European Council decided to 
broaden the mandate of the Centre to become a human rights 
agency. The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights was established 
by Council Regulation 168/2007 of February 15, 2007 and 
commenced its work on March 1, 2007.76 
The Agency is one of about thirty EU administrative 
agencies. They carry out administrative tasks, employing 
observational and scientific expertise that the Commission is not 
equipped to provide. It is significant that the Agency is not 
denominated as a “Human Rights” Agency, but as a 
“Fundamental Rights” Agency. First, this echoes the title of the 
Charter; the Agency is supposed to become a center of expertise 
for fundamental rights issues at the EU level, with the aim of 
making the contents of the Charter more tangible. Further, the 
term fundamental rights, which was preferred by the Council and 
the European Parliament to that of human rights, seems to refer, 
at least in Europe, more frequently to domestic constitutional 
guarantees while human rights is the term customarily used for 
international instruments.77 The Agency thus aims at the 
promotion of individual rights through administrative activity in 
complement to judicial protection. Its scope and influence 
remain limited. 
 
74. Council Regulation No. 1035/97, 1997 O.J. L 151. 
75. Id. art. 2. 
76. Council Regulation No. 168/2007, 2007 O.J. L 53/1. 
77. See J. von Bernstorff & A. Von Bogdandy, The EU Fundamental Rights Agency 
within the European and International Rights Architecture: The Legal Framework and Some 
Unsettled Issues in a New Field of Administrative Law, 46 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1023–33 
(2009). 
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A. Limited Scope 
Pursuant to article 2 of Regulation 168/2007, the Agency’s 
objective is “to provide the relevant institutions, bodies, offices 
and agencies of the Communities and its Member States . . . with 
assistance and expertise relating to fundamental rights.”78 This 
ambition meets a number of practical limits stemming from its 
statute: the Agency has no legislative or regulatory powers, no 
quasi-judicial competence similar to what an ombudsman would 
have (it cannot deal with individual complaints), and no 
authority to adopt legally binding decisions with effect upon 
third parties. The Agency’s powers are quite limited in trying to 
serve as a basis for significant administrative action. 
In accordance with article 3(3) of the regulation, the Agency 
“shall only deal with fundamental rights issues in the European 
Union and its Member States when implementing Community 
law.”79 This is even more restrictive than the Charter, which 
refers in article 51(1) to the entire field of EU law. Thus, the 
regulation was not intended to enable any review of activities in 
the areas of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters 
under the TEU,80 the so-called third pillar, a field that is 
particularly sensitive when it comes to the protection of 
fundamental rights. However, a Council Declaration of February 
12, 2007 regarding the consultation of the Agency within the so-
called third pillar indicates that “the Union institutions may, 
within the framework of the legislative process . . . each benefit, 
as appropriate and on a voluntary basis, from such expertise also 
within the areas of police and judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters.”81 
Notwithstanding the limitation implied by article 3(3), the 
French Council Presidency in the second semester of 2008 
commissioned an opinion by the Agency on the fundamental 
rights conformity of a draft framework decision on the use of air 
Passenger Name Records (“PNR”) for law enforcement purposes 
 
78. Council Regulation No. 168/2007, art. 2, 2007 O.J. L 53/1. 
79. Id. art. 3. 
80. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, 2002 O.J. C 325/05 
(as amended by the Treaty of Nice, 2001 O.J. C 80/1). 
81. See Council of the European Union, Proposal for a Council Regulation 
Establishing a European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Doc. No. 6166/07, 4 
(Feb. 2007). 
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under TEU articles 29, 30(1), and 34(2).82 In its opinion, the 
Agency concluded that part of the draft framework decision 
violated European fundamental rights standards under the 
European Convention of Human Rights and the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and that modifications were therefore 
necessary.83 The fact that an EU institution presented a specific 
request made it possible for the Agency to intervene. In the 
future, the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty should put an 
end to the special status of the field of cooperation in police and 
criminal affairs because the field is now covered by TFEU articles 
82 to 89. Note however, that the U.K. and Ireland by Protocol 21 
will not take part in such cooperative measures.84 
Article 3(3) of the Regulation 168/2007 states that the 
Agency “shall deal with fundamental-rights issues . . . in its 
Member States when implementing Community law.”85 The focus 
on implementation instead of the broader formulation “within 
the scope of application of Community law” seems deliberate,86 it 
authorizes the exclusion of cases where Member States derogate 
from Union law. Yet the more recent case law of the Court of 
Justice, which expands the concept of implementation, needs to 
be taken into account although, as mentioned earlier, there is a 
risk of provoking negative reactions from the part of some 
Member States’ constitutional courts and political circles. 
B. Preventive Role of the Agency 
The role of the Agency is a preventive one: it functions as an 
expert network identifying relevant fundamental rights issues 
with a view toward developing and reforming EU legislation. It 
may contribute to diminishing the likelihood of subsequent court 
intervention. 
 
82. See European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Opinion on the Proposal for 
a Council Framework Decision on the Use of Passenger Name Record (PNR) Data for Law 
Enforcement Purposes, (Oct. 28, 2008), available at http://www.fra.europa.eu/ 
fraWebsite/ research/opinions/op-pnr_en.htm. 
83. See id. ¶¶ 4, 10–13, 18–23, 28–31. 
84. Protocol No. 21 on the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland in regard 
to the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, annexed to the TEU post-Lisbon, supra 
note 1. 
85. Council Regulation No. 168/2007, art 3(3), 2007 O.J. L 53/1, at 4. 
86. See the discussion concerning the scope of the Charter, supra note 15. 
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The Agency can only give advice. Assistance may be 
provided to the political institutions where they request opinions, 
conclusions, and reports from the Agency.87 These contributions 
can have an impact upon the legislative process, but only if an 
EU institution has requested such an opinion or report. 
In the framework of its mandate to disseminate information, 
the Agency publishes thematic reports based on its analytical 
research and surveys.88 This limitation to thematic rather than 
particular national topics may be interpreted as preventing the 
Agency from disseminating information on occurrences in a 
specific Member State. However, it seems impossible to envisage 
thematic analysis without reference to the legal and factual 
situation in the Member States concerned. For instance, the 
Agency is just starting a survey on violence against women;89 facts 
and figures will be provided by Member States. To the extent it is 
in position to provide relevant information, the Agency may also 
become involved in a procedure under article 7 TEU. 
The Agency, which is an EU body, was also designed, as the 
Preamble to Regulation 168/2007 makes clear, in light of a 
model of specialized independent institutions promoting human 
rights, developed by the UN.90 This model has led to the creation 
of national human rights institutions in a number of countries. 
In a 1993 resolution, the UN General Assembly defined 
principles of independence and pluralism to be applied in the 
organization and functioning of these bodies (“Paris 
Principles”).91 The reference to the Paris Principles in Recital 20 
of the regulation suggests that compliance with them should be 
considered. While pluralism seems to be achieved in the various 
institutions managing the Agency, there is a serious restriction to 
its operational independence due to the fact that article 5(1) of 
the regulation confers upon the Council the competence to 
adopt the “Multiannual Framework” for the Agency.92 The 
Commission must propose this Framework, after consulting the 
management board of the Agency when preparing its proposal. 
 
87. Council Regulation No. 168/2007, arts. 4(1)(c)–(d), 2007 O.J. L 53/1, at 4. 
88. Id. art. 4(1)(f), at 5. 
89. Dick Leonard, The FRA Gets down to Work, THE EUROPEAN VOICE FOREIGN 
POLICY CENTRE, available at http://fpc.org.uk/about/staff/dick.leonard. 
90. Council Regulation No. 168/2007, pmbl., 2007 O.J. L 53/1, at 2. 
91. G.A. Res. 48/134, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/134 (Dec. 20, 1993). 
92. Council Regulation No. 168/2007, art. 5(1), 2007 O.J. L 53/1, at 5. 
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In brief, the mandate conferred to the Agency and the 
conditions for its operations are not in line with the idea of an 
independent human rights institution. The Agency depends on 
the Commission and the Council for its multi-annual work 
program.93 The Agency is not mandated to pronounce ex officio in 
the course of legislative procedure, but can only do so upon 
request of an EU institution. The scope of the Agency is 
restricted to the implementation of EC law; even if the entry into 
force of the Lisbon Treaty incorporates cooperation in police 
and criminal affairs into the scope of the Agency, it remains that 
the Regulation imposes a restrictive view of the mandate of the 
Agency concerning monitoring of the respect of fundamental 
rights in Member States. The Agency contributes to the provision 
of comparable and reliable information and data at the 
European level. A grand name for a modest task! It is difficult not 
to conclude that the mandate of the Agency should be widened 
in order that the Agency may provide a more effective 
contribution to the implementation of fundamental rights. 
CONCLUSION 
The entry into force of the Lisbon treaty has been received 
with relief by all those who considered that the institutional 
debate had lasted too long and hampered the progress of 
European policies. As regards the protection of fundamental 
rights, the Lisbon Treaty is a landmark, but less significant than it 
may appear at first. The Charter acquires the authority of 
primary law, but not that of a bill of rights of the Union; its 
contribution to the protection of fundamental rights is to be 
made together with other sources of equivalent value, namely 
other general principles of Union law. A multilevel system of 
protection of fundamental rights emerges, made more complex 
than before by the strong affirmation of the European identity by 
the Court of Justice, by the strong affirmation of national identity 
by national constitutional courts, and by the Lisbon Treaty itself. 
Further, one may doubt the possible efficiency of the Agency of 
Fundamental Rights as a common instrument of control of 
implementation. Concerning fundamental rights, there is still 
much to do and to think about. 
 
93. Id. pmbl., at 2. 
